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KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON: IS THE RESPONSE TO CURB 
THE EFFECT OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION GOING 
TOO FAR? 
Jonathan Michels∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a 
landmark eminent domain case, Kelo v. City of New London.1  In a 5-4 
decision, the Court held that a development plan for the purpose of 
economic rejuvenation of unblighted property was considered a 
“public use” and therefore, a constitutional use of eminent domain 
power under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2  The deci-
sion has prompted significant outcry and response from the federal 
government, state legislatures, and grassroots campaigns by citizens 
of a number of states.3  Citing the lack of federal constitutional pro-
tection of private property rights in the wake of the Kelo decision, the 
response intends to restrict state and local government eminent do-
main power through federal legislation, state legislation, and court 
challenges to Kelo-type takings.4  The swift, nationwide response has 
been at the forefront of media attention.5  However, it is unclear 
whether such immediate and broad remedies will excessively restrict 
eminent domain powers.  Will state governments act hastily in re-
sponse to the Kelo decision and craft remedies so broad that they will 
limit the ability of government to utilize eminent domain power for 
necessary future projects that would pass pre-Kelo constitutional mus-
ter?  Or will people be encouraged to challenge legitimate public use 
takings by popular support, thereby increasing the likelihood of frivo-
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S.B.A. (Finance 
and Management), 2004, Georgetown University. 
 1 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 2 Id. at 2668 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4). 
 3 See infra Part V.A-C. 
 4 See infra Part V. 
 5 Id. 
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lous litigation?  These are questions that may surface as state legisla-
tures continue to consider restrictive eminent domain legislation.  
These questions will also continue to be at the forefront of discussion 
as long as groups rally to protect victims of condemnation proceed-
ings through constitutional challenges.  The ultimate question then 
arises: will the efforts to limit Kelo’s impact result in unintended re-
straints on the legitimate power of government to take private land 
for economic development? 
This Comment begins with an examination in Part II of the 
background on eminent domain power and the development of the 
public use test.6  Part III continues with an explanation of the Kelo 
conflict in New London, Connecticut and an analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in the decision.7  The Comment then assesses in 
Part IV the potential dangers that may flow from the broad view of 
eminent domain powers adopted by the Supreme Court.8  Part V in-
forms the reader of the federal and state legislation, both proposed 
and enacted, that attempts to respond to the Kelo decision.9  This sec-
tion also examines post-Kelo constitutional challenges to Kelo-type tak-
ings.10  Further, Part VI addresses the numerous potential routes that 
governments at any level can pursue in response to Kelo, with an ex-
amination of the potential advantages and disadvantages of each 
form of action.11  This Comment recommends a more cautious, re-
stricted governmental response to Kelo rather than extensive legisla-
tion.  The author concludes, in Part VII, that a moratorium on Kelo-
type takings to allow time for the federal and state legislatures to ad-
dress the true impact of the Kelo decision is the most prudent course 
of action as opposed to any hastily enacted legislation that may prove 
too restrictive on the eminent domain power in the future. 
II. BACKGROUND ON EMINENT DOMAIN POWER AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE TEST 
The power of the Government to take private property is as-
serted in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and 
has long been recognized as an inherent power of the sovereign.12  
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states “nor shall private 
 6 See infra Part II. 
 7 See infra Part III. 
 8 See infra Part IV. 
 9 See infra Part V. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See infra Part VI. 
 12 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4. 
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property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”13  This 
restriction on the federal government found in the Fifth Amendment 
is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.14  
Litigation over governmental takings has encompassed a breadth of 
issues, from defining “public use” in an explicit taking to ascertaining 
whether government regulation has constituted a regulatory taking.15  
Whether an explicit governmental taking is for a “public use” has 
been an aspect of the takings doctrine that has developed and 
changed significantly over the course of history through litigation.16  
The Takings Clause has been often litigated in state courts because of 
its application to the states through incorporation by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.17  Courts have applied a deferential rational basis stan-
dard of review when deciding whether a governmental takings satis-
fies a public use, similar to that used when analyzing the constitution-
ality of state action under the police power. 18
The most restrictive reading of the Takings Clause would sug-
gest, as some early state courts held, that the “public use” could be 
satisfied only if the property subject to the governmental taking was 
actually used by the general public.19  The Supreme Court departed 
from this restrictive view early in its jurisprudence, and instead 
adopted a broader public purpose test. 20  The public purpose test is 
 13 Id. 
 14 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).  
Selective Bill of Rights provisions, including the Fifth Amendment, are part of the 
liberty protected from state interference by the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (1968). 
 15 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–35 (1978) 
(applying a balancing test to determine whether a regulatory taking had occurred 
which would require the city to pay just compensation); Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that if a property is deprived 
of all value by a regulation, then this is a total taking requiring just compensation); 
Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
342 (2002) (holding that a temporary moratorium is not a per se taking and reject-
ing the idea of conceptually severing the part of the property, either physically or 
temporally, from the whole).  This Comment focuses on the limited question of 
whether an explicit taking for economic development satisfies a public use.  See infra 
Parts III.-VII. 
 16 See infra notes 19–74 and accompanying text. 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S. at 241. 
 18 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 19 See Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 338–39 (Mich. 1887); Gaylord v. Sanitary 
Dist. of Chi., 68 N.E. 522, 524–25 (Ill. 1903); Jacobs v. Clearview Water Supply Co., 69 
A. 870, 872 (Pa. 1908). 
 20 Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 159–61 (1896) (holding that 
taking for the purpose of constructing an irrigation ditch was a public purpose and 
in the public interest, and therefore constitutional). 
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satisfied by a government taking in which the government maintains 
ownership of the land and utilizes it to promote the general public 
welfare, such as building a highway or a military base.21  The highway 
would have satisfied the most restrictive interpretation of the public 
purpose test, but the military base only passes constitutional muster 
under the broader public purpose test.22  This is because the highway 
is available for use by the general public, passing even the strictest in-
terpretation, while the military base is not accessible by the general 
public but exists for a public purpose, failing the strictest interpreta-
tion but passing a broader view of the test.23
The public purpose test is further complicated, however, when 
the subsequent owner of the private property taken by the govern-
ment is another private party.24  In the landmark case of Berman v. 
Parker,25 the Supreme Court held that an economic redevelopment 
plan enacted to cure a blighted neighborhood in Washington, D.C. 
by selling or leasing the condemned land to a private redevelopment 
company was constitutional even though a piece of commercial 
property subject to condemnation was not itself blighted.26  Congress 
passed the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act (“Act”) in 1945 
in an effort to eliminate and prevent slum and substandard housing 
conditions within the city.27  The Act was specifically enacted as a re-
sult of a determination that “conditions existing in the District of Co-
lumbia with respect to substandard housing and blighted areas . . . 
are injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.”28  Con-
gress further found that in order to eliminate these housing condi-
tions, it would be necessary to acquire all of the property in the 
area.29  In order to achieve the stated goals, Congress determined 
that a comprehensive and cohesive plan of redevelopment would be 
necessary to eliminate the substandard conditions, as opposed to 
leaving the changes to piecemeal private or public development.30  
 21 Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925); Rindge Co. v. 
County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 708 (1923). 
 22 Old Dominion Land Co., 269 U.S. at 66; Rindge Co., 262 U.S. at 706. 
 23 Old Dominion Land Co., 269 U.S. at 66–67; Rindge Co., 262 U.S. at 706. 
 24 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 
467 U.S. 229 (1984); see also infra notes 18–52 and accompanying text. 
 25 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 26 Id. at 35–36. 
 27 Id. at 28. 
 28 Id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-701 (LexisNexis 1951), repealed by D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 6-301.02(4) (LexisNexis 2006)). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 29. 
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Further, pursuant to the Act, Congress created the National Capital 
Planning Commission (“Commission”), and entrusted the Commis-
sion with the power of eminent domain to acquire the necessary 
property to achieve the comprehensive redevelopment and eliminate 
the blighted neighborhoods.31  The Commission was entitled to lease 
or sell the acquired land to private redevelopment companies, indi-
viduals, or partnerships so long as the party would carry out the rede-
velopment plan.32
Under the power given by the Act, the Commission developed a 
comprehensive plan of redevelopment for an area of D.C. which, 
through extensive findings, the Commission determined to be 
blighted and beyond repair.33  The Plaintiffs challenged the taking as 
unconstitutional because their property, a commercial department 
store, was not slum housing targeted by the Act.34  Even so, their 
property was subject to the redevelopment plan and was to be trans-
ferred to private ownership.35  The United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint seeking to 
enjoin the condemnation and held the Act constitutional.36
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the taking 
authorized by the Act met the requirement of a “public use.”37  It first 
found that Congress had police power authority over the District of 
Columbia just as a state would have over its affairs.38  To determine 
whether the redevelopment plan was a “public use” for purposes of 
the eminent domain power, the Court approached the question from 
the perspective of Congress’ broad police powers.39
 31 Berman, 348 U.S. at 29. 
 32 Id. at 30. 
 33 Id.  The findings included statistics that 64.3% of the dwellings were beyond 
repair, 57.8% of the dwellings had outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 29.3% lacked 
electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs, and 83.8% lacked central heat-
ing.  Id. 
 34 Id. at 31. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 724–26 (D.D.C. 1953). 
 37 Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-34. 
 38 Id. at 31–32. 
 39 Id. at 32.  As the Court asserts: 
We deal . . . with what traditionally has been known as the police 
power.  An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruit-
less, for each case must turn on its own facts.  The definition is essen-
tially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the pur-
poses of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically 
capable of complete definition.  Subject to specific constitutional limi-
tations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been 
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The Court understood Congress’ powers to promote the public 
welfare to be very broad.40  When determining what is in the public 
welfare, the Court noted that the public welfare is “spiritual as well as 
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary . . . beautiful as well as healthy, 
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully pa-
trolled.”41  The Court determined that a congressional finding of sub-
standard housing conditions and blighted neighborhoods where 
crime and immorality flourish and sanity and cleanliness are lacking 
can justify using the police power to correct such problems.42  How-
ever, once a determination is made that the pursued end is legiti-
mate, the means to achieve the end, even use of eminent domain, is 
within congressional discretion.43  The Court stated that solely be-
cause the ultimate owner of the property may be a private party does 
not make the Act unconstitutional.44  The Court further explained 
that “[t]he public end may be as well or better served through an 
agency of private enterprise than through a department of govern-
ment.”45  Congress is not required to address a problem one building 
at a time, but instead can focus on the area as a whole when deter-
mining an appropriate course of action and plan.46  Therefore, the 
Court concluded that the comprehensive redevelopment plan to 
eliminate substandard housing and blight in the city that required a 
balanced and integrated plan to achieve the goal, thus including ap-
pellants’ property not itself blighted, was constitutional.47  Further, 
the Court concluded that Congress established adequate standards to 
eliminate slums and the blighted areas that may produce slums.48
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court further declared its defer-
ence to legislative judgments regarding the public purpose determi-
nation where the subsequent owner would be a private party in Ha-
waii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.49  The Hawaii Legislature enacted 
the Land Reform Act of 1967,50 which provided for the condemna-
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.  In such cases, the legislature, 
not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs . . . . 
Id. 
 40 Id. at 33. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Berman, 347 U.S. at 32–33. 
 43 Id. at 33. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 33–34. 
 46 Id. at 35. 
 47 Id. at 34–35. 
 48 Berman, 348 U.S. at 35. 
 49 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 50 HAW. REV. STAT. § 516-1, et seq. (1967). 
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tion of private land held in oligopoly by a few private owners.51  Prior 
to 1967, much of the privately owned land in Hawaii, due to a system 
of land transfers dating from the islands’ settlement, was held in the 
hands of elite private landowners.52  Finding that this concentrated 
land ownership harmed the residential housing market, caused infla-
tion of land prices, and injured the public welfare,53 and with the pri-
vate landowners unwilling to sell any of their property, the legislature 
passed the Land Reform Act.  The Act gave authority to the Hawaii 
Housing Authority to condemn the private land and transfer the land 
to the private party who had previously been leasing such land.54  The 
Hawaii Legislature believed that the condemnation would promote 
the purpose of redistributing land while ameliorating the harsh tax 
consequences to the transferor land owners, presumably the primary 
reason for resistance to sale in the first place.55  The transferee private 
parties would receive the land in fee simple if these parties made a 
showing that the condemnation would “effectuate the public pur-
poses of the Act” and just compensation was paid to the transferor 
land owner.56  The constitutionality of the Act was challenged as a vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment by a private landowner who would not 
acquiesce to compulsory arbitration to determine just compensa-
tion.57  Initially, the District Court of Hawaii’s opinion was that the 
Land Reform Act was constitutional.58  However, on review, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the Land Reform Act unconsti-
tutional because it did nothing but change the ownership of land 
from one private party to another.59
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, held that a condemnation of private property by the 
state legislature of Hawaii in an effort to divide a land oligopoly 
amongst greater number of owners was constitutional.60  After a dis-
cussion of Berman v. Parker,61 the majority reiterated its holding that 
 51 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233. 
 52 Id. at 232.  The state and federal governments owned almost forty-nine percent 
of the state’s land and another forty-seven percent was in the hands of only seventy-
two private landowners.  Id.  Further, of this forty-seven percent owned privately, 
forty percent was owned by only eighteen landowners.  Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 233. 
 55 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233. 
 56 Id. at 233 (internal citations omitted). 
 57 Id. at 234–35. 
 58 Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62, 69–70 (D. Haw. 1979). 
 59 Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 60 Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984). 
 61 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
MICHELSFINAL 1/12/2007  11:08:47 AM 
534 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:527 
 
“[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of 
a sovereign’s police powers.”62  The majority explained that decisions 
of the legislature, even those involving the eminent domain power, 
shall be granted judicial deference, and the Court will “not substitute 
its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes a pub-
lic use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.’”63  
The Court noted that “where the exercise of the eminent domain 
power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court 
has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public 
Use Clause.”64  The majority held that the Hawaii Act was constitu-
tional as a valid exercise of the State eminent domain power to break 
up the land oligopoly and eliminate the evils which followed from 
such a situation because the methods used by the legislature and the 
procedures employed were a “comprehensive and rational approach 
to identifying and correcting market failure.”65  The use of the emi-
nent domain power was a rational approach to serve a legitimate leg-
islative purpose regardless of the fact that the property was trans-
ferred to another private owner.66  The Court made clear that a 
taking “executed for no reason other than to confer a private benefit 
on a particular private party” would be unconstitutional.67  However, 
the Hawaii Act did not confer such a private benefit, but instead at-
tacked the evil of concentrated property ownership, which was a le-
gitimate public purpose.68
Inevitably, with such a broad interpretation of public use, state 
governments began to utilize their power under eminent domain for 
economic redevelopment projects that were not intended to cure 
blight, but solely to provide an economic boost.69  In 1981, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld a statute which allowed 
for condemnation of private land to “alleviate and prevent conditions 
of unemployment and to preserve and develop industry and com-
merce.”70  The statute’s purpose was to condemn private property in 
 62 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240. 
 63 Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 
(1896)) (internal citations omitted). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 242. 
 66 Id. at 243. 
 67 Id. at 245. 
 68 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245. 
 69 See, e.g., Michigan Economic Development Corporations Act, MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 125.1622 (1981). 
 70 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458 
(Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 
2004). 
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order to build a General Motors assembly plant.71  The General Mo-
tors plant did not come close to living up to its expected revenue and 
job creation, and “[i]n all likelihood, it destroyed more jobs than it 
created.”72  Subsequently, however, in 2004, the Supreme Court of 
Michigan overruled its own earlier holding, and held that a general-
ized economic benefit to the community that is the product of a pri-
vate entity’s profit maximization is not a public use.73  The Supreme 
Court of the United States granted certiorari in Kelo to clarify the law 
in this area in its 2004 term.74
III.     WHAT HAPPENED IN NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT? 
A. Susette Kelo and the Victims of the Condemnation 
Susette Kelo and her neighbors made their homes, some over a 
century old, in New London, Connecticut, which they enjoyed for its 
waterfront location since the early 1900s.75  Some moved in more re-
cently, but have nonetheless taken great care to improve and main-
tain their private residences.76  Still others were owners of investment 
properties in the area.77  They all came together to challenge a city 
council that made it quite clear that it would prefer revenue generat-
ing redeveloped real estate in the city instead of private homeown-
ers.78  In total, nine people owned fifteen properties in the area that 
was the subject of this heated litigation.79  None of the property in 
question was kept in disrepair or blighted condition so as to require 
redevelopment.80  These people were not holding out for more 
money; they were fighting for their right to stay in their homes with 
their families.81
 71 Id. at 457. 
 72 Institute for Justice, Landmark Eminent Domain Abuse Decision, IJ.com (July 31, 
2004), http://www.ij.org/private_property/michigan/7_31_04pr.html. 
 73 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787. 
 74 Kelo v. City of New London, 542 U.S. 965 (2004). 
 75 Petitioner, Wilhelmina Dery, has been in her home in New London since 1918, 
and her husband has lived in the house for nearly sixty years, since they married.  
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005).  The house has been in 
the family for over 100 years, and her son lives next door.  Id. at 2671. (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 76 Susette Kelo has lived in her home since 1997 and has made substantial im-
provements to the home since she moved in.  Id. at 2660. 
 77 Petitioners live in ten of the properties and five are investment properties.  Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 81 Id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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B. You’re in the Way, So the Government Will Force You Out 
The City of New London became a target for economic redevel-
opment in 1998 after years of economic decline and increased un-
employment levels.82  In an effort to plan a cohesive redevelopment 
of the city, a private nonprofit organization, the New London Devel-
opment Corporation (NLDC), reemerged after years of being inac-
tive.83  Only a month after a planning budget was created for the 
NLDC,84 Pfizer announced the construction of a $300 million re-
search facility next to the proposed redevelopment area.85  In an at-
tempt to capitalize on the industry moving into the area, the NLDC 
planned and submitted redevelopment plans to state agencies, which 
approved these schemes.86  The development plans included areas for 
a hotel, restaurants, shopping, marinas, new residences, research and 
development office space, and “park support” (parking or retail ser-
vice for the state park).87  In order to effectuate the plan, the city 
council authorized the NLDC to purchase property or to acquire 
property by exercising eminent domain in the city’s name.88  The 
plan was intended to create jobs, generate tax revenue, help revitalize 
downtown New London, beautify the city, and make the waterfront 
and park leisure and recreational destinations.89  The NLDC, during 
litigation, declared they would lease some of the land to private de-
velopers should the developers go along with the plan.90
C. The Fight Moves to the Courts 
Nine victims of the condemnation filed suit against the city 
council and the NLDC in New London Superior Court asserting that 
the taking of their land could not be considered a “public use” as re-
quired by the Fifth Amendment.91  The Superior Court granted an 
 82 Id. at 2658–59. 
 83 Id. at 2659. 
 84 The State authorized a $5.35 million bond issue for planning activities and a 
$10 million bond issue for a state park.  Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 87 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 509–10 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S. 
Ct. 2655 (2005) (specifically describing the property to be developed and the 
planned development). 
 88 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659–60. 
 89 Id. at 2659. 
 90 Id. at 2660 n.4. 
 91 Kelo v. City of New London, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 789, at *1 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
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injunction prohibiting the taking of property for the park or marina 
support.92  However, the court also held that the property scheduled 
to be used as office space could be condemned for the redevelop-
ment.93
Because of the divided judgment by the New London Superior 
Court, allowing eminent domain for some of the property and grant-
ing an injunction for other parts,94 the landowners and the city coun-
cil both appealed the decision.95  The Supreme Court of Connecticut, 
pursuant to statute,96 transferred the appeal from the Appellate Divi-
sion.97  In a comprehensive opinion analyzing each parcel of redevel-
opment, the Supreme Court of Connecticut found the entire rede-
velopment program constitutional, thereby affirming in part and 
reversing in part the judgment of the superior court.98  The court 
held that the city council’s proposed takings were all valid because 
the taking of land as part of economic development project furthers 
the public interest and thus satisfies the public use requirement.99  
The Supreme Court of Connecticut specifically held that the munici-
pal economic development was a constitutionally valid public use 
considering that the intended use of land was sufficiently definite and 
had been given “reasonable attention” during the planning process, 
which was significant to ensure that the plan was being enacted with 
the public interest as the primary objective.100
It was in this decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut that 
the first judicial voices of dissent were heard.101  Three of the seven 
justices, dissenting, did not believe that the takings at issue in New 
London were for a valid public use and further believed that there 
should be a heightened standard of review for takings for economic 
redevelopment.102  In order for an economic development plan to be 
a valid public use, according to the dissent, clear and convincing evi-
dence needs to be presented that the benefits of the development 
 92 Id. at *341. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507– 08 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S. 
Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 96 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-199(c) (2005). 
 97 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 508 n.3 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S. 
Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 98 Id. at 574. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 573–74. 
 101 Id. at 574 (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Sulli-
van and Justice Katz joined in Justice Zarella’s opinion.  Id. 
 102 Kelo, 843 A.2d at 587 (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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plan would be realized by the city, an idea rejected by the majority 
because of administrative infeasibility.103
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari,104 
and, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut that a development plan for unblighted property for a 
purpose of economic rejuvenation was a public use, and therefore, a 
valid use of eminent domain power consistent with the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.105  Justice Stevens delivered the opin-
ion of the Court in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer joined.106
The Kelo majority opinion explained that a city could not take 
private land to confer a private benefit on a particular private party,107 
nor could it use the pretext of public use to bestow a private bene-
fit.108  The Court distinguished such scenarios by recognizing, as the 
Connecticut Supreme Court did, that in New London there was a 
comprehensive development plan with no illegitimate purpose—the 
plan was carefully designed to pursue the public welfare goals of the 
legislature with no evidence that it was favoring a particular private 
beneficiary.109  This fact, according to the majority, was sufficient to 
establish that a particular private party was not benefited by the 
plan.110
Justice Stevens recognized that, although the land would not be 
open to the general public, such a requirement has long been aban-
doned by Supreme Court precedent.111  According to such precedent, 
the Justice explained that the public use language in the Fifth 
Amendment should be interpreted broadly to mean a public pur-
pose.112  The majority opinion noted the policy of deference to legis-
lative judgments when determining the constitutionality of a tak-
ing.113  Such deference, the majority explained, “afford[s] legislatures 
 103 Id. at 588 (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 104 Id. at 500, cert. granted, 542 U.S. 965 (2004). 
 105 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005). 
 106 Id. at 2657. 
 107 Id. at 2661 (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)). 
 108 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661. 
 109 Id.; Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 595 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S. 
Ct. 2655 (2005) (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 110 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662. 
 111 Id. (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 244). 
 112 Id. at 2662–63. 
 113 Id. at 2663–64 (discussing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) and Hawaii 
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)). 
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broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the 
takings power.”114
The Court, citing Berman v. Parker,115 stated that judicial defer-
ence shall be afforded to the legislature, and approved of the legisla-
ture’s goals to make the community “beautiful as well as healthy, spa-
cious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”116  
Even though the redevelopment program in Berman was targeted at 
rejuvenating a blighted neighborhood,117 the Kelo majority found the 
Berman redevelopment plan to have encompassed much more than 
just correcting blight.118  In making this determination, Justice Ste-
vens analogized the Berman plan to the redevelopment plan in New 
London.119  Although the area in New London was admittedly not 
blighted, the majority opinion deferred to the city council’s judgment 
that the unemployment rate and the economic decline in the city 
were enough to necessitate the economic rejuvenation plan which 
satisfied the public purpose requirement of the Fifth Amendment.120  
In ultimately deciding that this plan served a public purpose, Justice 
Stevens pointed to the new jobs and increased tax revenue that were 
expected to result from the plan, which would be to the benefit of 
the general public.121
Justice Stevens proceeded to reject two rules proposed by the 
landowners in New London.122  The Justice first refused to adopt a 
bright line rule that economic development is not a public use.123  
Pointing to the broad view of public purpose, the deference to legis-
lative judgment, and the role of government in promoting economic 
development, the majority found no reason to adopt such a rule.124  
The majority also rejected a proposed rule that the expected public 
benefits, like tax revenues and more jobs, must be found with “rea-
sonable certainty” before the redevelopment project could begin.125  
The Court believed this requirement would significantly hinder al-
 114 Id. at 2664. 
 115 See supra notes 24–48 and accompanying text. 
 116 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 33). 
 117 See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text. 
 118 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663–64. 
 119 Id. at 2665. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 2665–66. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665–66.   
 125 Id. at 2667–68. 
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most any redevelopment plan.126  In addressing the fact that private 
parties will benefit from the redevelopment because they may be in-
volved in the construction or other aspects of the implementation, 
the majority disagreed, noting that private parties often benefit from 
takings done for a public purpose.127  The majority opinion, however, 
avoided the question of constitutionality of such transfers occurring 
outside the scope of a comprehensive plan because this was not at is-
sue in the case.128
Justice Kennedy, who also joined the opinion of the Court, wrote 
a concurrence in which he expressed some hesitation and concern 
over the validity of the taking of land from one private party and 
transferring it to a different private party.129  The concurring opinion 
affirmed the rational basis test as the appropriate review of govern-
mental takings, but urged that the deferential review should not pre-
vent the Court from striking down takings “intended to favor a par-
ticular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public 
benefits.”130  Justice Kennedy advocated a more stringent rational ba-
sis review by the courts when an economic development taking may 
favor a private party, specifically stating that “the objection [should 
be treated] as a serious one and [the court should] review the record 
to see if it has merit, though with the presumption that the govern-
ment’s actions were reasonable and intended to serve a public pur-
pose.”131  The concurring opinion found that the economic redevel-
opment plan in New London was for a valid public purpose because 
it was clearly established that the plan was carefully designed to pro-
vide for economic revitalization and was not intended to specifically 
benefit any private party.132  In foresight, Justice Kennedy noted that 
takings where the ultimate recipient will be a private party may re-
quire a “more stringent standard of review” if there is suspicion of 
other motives behind the “public purpose,” but foreclosed the idea of 
a presumption of invalidity for economic redevelopment takings.133
 126 Id. at 2668. 
 127 Id. at 2666 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1954) (“The public 
end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than 
through a department of government—or so the Congress might conclude.  We 
cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public pur-
poses of community redevelopment projects.”)). 
 128 Id. at 2667. 
 129 Id. at 2669–70 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 130 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 131 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 132 Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 133 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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D. The Dissenting Voices in Support of Private Property Rights 
Justice O’Connor wrote a strong dissenting opinion, which was 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas.134  
In possibly one of the most cited lines of the entire decision, Justice 
O’Connor stated that due to the majority’s opinion, “[t]he specter of 
condemnation hangs over all property.”135  Justice O’Connor urged 
the Court to realize that allowing economic development to consti-
tute a valid public purpose puts all private property at risk if it can be 
put to a more beneficial use by the public.136  According to Justice 
O’Connor, private property takings for economic development re-
sulting in incidental public benefits eliminate the distinction between 
private and public use of property and “thereby effectively . . . delete 
the words ‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”137
In elaborating the Court’s role in takings for economic devel-
opment, O’Connor stated that there must be judicial checks to pro-
tect property rights, security of property, and fairness.138  The Justice 
noted that regardless of judicial deference to legislatures, “[a]n ex-
ternal, judicial check on how the public use requirement is inter-
preted, however limited, is necessary if this constraint on government 
power is to retain any meaning.”139
Justice O’Connor differentiated Berman and Midkiff, cases heavily 
relied upon by the majority.140  While private property was taken for 
private use in each of those cases, Justice O’Connor distinguished 
them by pointing to the specific harm that each legislature addressed 
by condemning the property, as opposed to a vague concept of eco-
nomic stimulation.141  The Justice noted that, under those circum-
stances, the public purpose was directly realized by the elimination of 
the harm.142  According to O’Connor, this was dramatically different 
 134 Id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, 
and Justice Thomas joined the dissent. 
 135 Id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 136 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 137 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 138 Id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 139 Id. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 140 See supra text accompanying notes 115–121. 
 141 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673–74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that the taking for private use was for the pur-
pose of curing blight and slums from a D.C. neighborhood); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that the taking for private use was to break up 
the oligopolistic land control structure in Hawaii)). 
 142 Id. at 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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from a holding that “the sovereign may take private property cur-
rently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary 
private use, so long as the new use is predicated to generate some 
secondary benefit for the public—such as increased tax revenue, 
more jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure.”143  Regardless of the fact 
that there was a comprehensive plan in New London, according to 
O’Connor, nothing prevents a plan that is less cohesive, less thor-
ough, or more speculative from passing this broadened public pur-
pose test.144  Justice O’Connor concluded by warning that the defer-
ential review posited by the majority will benefit “those citizens with 
disproportionate influence and power in the political process, includ-
ing large corporations and development firms,”145 and harm “those 
with fewer resources.”146
Justice Thomas, although joining in Justice O’Connor’s dissent, 
also wrote a dissenting opinion of his own.147  Justice Thomas believed 
that by affirming that a “vague promise of new jobs and increased tax 
revenues” satisfies a public purpose for a redevelopment plan that “is 
also suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer Corporation,” the Court has 
essentially allowed for any taking to be considered “for a ‘public 
use.’”148  Justice Thomas rejected the idea that any economic redevel-
opment plan could be a public use by explaining that there was no 
basis in the original understanding of the Fifth Amendment for it to 
be construed to mean anything other than “authoriz[ing] takings for 
public use only if the government or the public actually uses the 
taken property.”149  The Justice believed that expanding the “public 
use” test to become a broad public purpose test and giving significant 
deference to the legislature in determining that broad public pur-
pose were both products of misguided jurisprudence.150  According to 
Justice Thomas, “[n]o compensation is possible for the subjective 
value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indignity in-
flicted by uprooting them from their homes.”151  Further, due to be-
ing the most frequently targeted places for economic redevelopment, 
“these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities.”152  
 143 Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 144 Id. at 2676–77 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 145 Id. at 2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 146 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).   
 147 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 148 Id. at 2677–78 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 149 Id. at 2682 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 150 Id. at 2683–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 151 Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 152 Id. at 2686–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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The Justice would therefore hold the takings at issue as unconstitu-
tional in violation of the Public Use Clause.153
IV.     WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH SUCH A BROAD VIEW 
OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN POWER? 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo, embodying a broad view 
of eminent domain power and allowing governmental takings of land 
for private use for purposes of economic redevelopment, is unsettling 
to the nation as a whole for a number of reasons.  All property is po-
tentially at risk.  If a public benefit can be gleaned by increased tax 
revenue or more jobs, then how is it ever possible that a taking of 
residential property for the purpose of putting in commercial devel-
opment would not be for a public use?  Further, given a standard of 
only deferential rational basis review, it is difficult to determine how 
potential takings motivated to benefit private parties can be properly 
scrutinized.  Justice Kennedy, in concurrence, urged “meaningful ra-
tional basis review,”154 but how this should be applied is a mystery.  
Under rational basis review, underhanded motives or particular 
benefits to private parties becomes a “test of whether the legislature 
has a stupid staff.”155  As it is likely that any and every economic de-
velopment taking will be cast in the light of increased tax revenues 
and higher employment rates, without more intense scrutiny, no 
court will be able to ascertain underlying motives when politically-
connected, private corporations receive land from poor landowners 
who have no choice but to acquiesce.156  Further, the public/private 
distinction after Kelo becomes so merged that it emasculates any 
meaning from the public use test,157 and as Justice O’Connor pointed 
out in dissent, this is the trouble with economic development takings 
where private benefit and incidental public benefit co-exist.158  While 
both the majority and dissent recognized that a private taking for the 
particular benefit of another private party was unconstitutional,159 
with rational basis review and presumption of validity of the taking, it 
appears disconcertingly easy for the legislature to cover up true mo-
tives under a pretext of “tax gains” or “more jobs” or “generalized 
economic resurgence.” 
 153 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2687 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 154 Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 155 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992). 
 156 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 157 See id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 158 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 159 See supra notes 107-08, 130, 136–37, 149 and accompanying text. 
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Even though concern over the potential implications of Kelo may 
be justified in light of the broad eminent domain power described by 
the majority of the Court, it is still wise and cautious to avoid any ex-
cessive reaction, whether intentional or unintentional.  As opposed to 
succumbing to influence caused by the haste and alarm following the 
decision, legislatures at the federal and state level should take time to 
properly analyze the true, practical implications of the decisions, thus 
avoiding overbroad legislation that may inadvertently constrain even 
broadly acceptable eminent domain programs.  In order to prudently 
go about such a process, it would be advisable for the legislature to 
enact a moratorium on takings of private land in which the subse-
quent owner or occupier will also be a private party, establish a com-
mittee to determine proper legislative response, and draft such legis-
lation so as to ensure that its scope is appropriately limited.  This 
Comment discusses the recommended response in more detail in 
Part VI. 
V. WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT KELO? 
A. Federal Action in the House and Senate 
Congress has moved quickly to propose and pass legislation to 
limit the effect of the Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New 
London.160  Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have 
proposed legislation that would limit Kelo by withholding federal 
funds for economic redevelopment projects.161  The federal govern-
ment has the power to pass such legislation through the use of 
Spending Clause of the Constitution.162
On November 30, 2005, President Bush signed into law the first 
federal legislation aimed at curbing the effects of Kelo.163  The en-
acted law is an amendment to a Treasury, Transportation, and Hous-
ing and Urban Development Appropriations bill barring federal 
transportation funds from being used in projects that take private 
 160 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 161 See infra text accompanying notes 163–79. 
 162 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence 
and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be 
uniform throughout the United States.”); see Transportation, Treasury, Housing and 
Urban Development, The Judiciary, The District of Columbia, and Independent 
Agencies Appropriations Act [hereinafter “Act”], Pub. L. No. 109-115, 119 Stat. 2396 
(2005) (Congressional Appropriations Bill expressly utilizing spending clause 
power).  
 163 Act, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. at 2494–2495. 
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property for economic redevelopment that primarily benefit private 
entities.164  This legislation was introduced in the House and passed 
in the Senate before being signed into law by the president.165  The 
bill enumerates specified projects that would be considered for a 
public use, including mass transit, railroad, and other commonly ac-
cepted public uses.166  Further, the bill enumerates as a public use 
“projects for the removal of an immediate threat to public health and 
safety or Brownfields as defined in the Small Business Liability Relief 
and Brownfields Revitalization Act.”167
The language of the enacted legislation resembles a proposed 
Senate bill entitled “Protection of Homes, Small Businesses, and Pri-
vate Property Act of 2005.”168  The proposed legislation states that 
eminent domain power is only for public use but further provides 
that “the term ‘public use’ shall not be construed to include eco-
nomic development.”169  The bill is an express limitation on the fed-
eral government, but also applies to state and local government by re-
stricting the use of federal funds for such projects.170  More recently, a 
bill entitled “Empowering More Property Owners With Enhanced 
Rights Act of 2005” (EMPOWER Act) has been proposed in the Sen-
ate.171  This bill would enhance the rights of, and provide advocates 
for, private property and small business owners affected by federal 
use of the eminent domain power.172
The House of Representatives has also passed a resolution sub-
sequent to the Supreme Court decision stating its “grave disapproval 
of . . . the majority opinion of the Supreme Court . . . that nullifies 
the protections afforded private property owners in the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”173  The resolution states that the 
Supreme Court opinion justifies eminent domain takings “for the 
 164 Id. 
 165 H.R. 3058, 109th Cong. (2005) (passed on June 30, 2005 by a vote of 231 to 
189). 
 166 Act, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. at 2495. 
 167 Id.  The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act is 
primarily an environmental act passed to provide relief to small businesses from li-
ability under CERCLA and to promote cleanup and reuse of Brownfields and assisted 
state response for environmental clean up.  Small Business Liability Relief and 
Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002). 
 168 S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 169 Id. at § 3. 
 170 Id.  The States would still have the ability to utilize state funds to pursue these 
projects, if they so choose, as this is not regulated by the bill.  Id. 
 171 S. 1883, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 172 Id. 
 173 H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005) (agreed to by a vote of 365 to 33). 
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sole benefit of another private person.”174  The House also has pro-
posed legislation similar to that in the Senate defining “public use” to 
specifically not include economic development projects.175  Similarly, 
the proposed legislation expressly limits the federal government and 
limits state and local government through the use of federal funds.176  
Other means proposed by representatives in the House to limit pri-
vate property takings for economic redevelopment are to “withhold 
community development block grant funds from States and commu-
nities,”177 to limit federal funds for economic development should the 
government not pay the relocation costs for people whose land is 
taken for such projects,178 and to amend the Constitution of the 
United States.179
Congress needs to be cautious in passing legislation that may 
prove to be too constricting on necessary eminent domain power.  
Much of the proposed legislation is too far reaching, namely those 
proposed bills that merely say that “economic development never sat-
isfies a public use” and therefore does not support the use of eminent 
domain power.180  Further, the House Resolution misstates the major-
ity holding in Kelo when it states that the opinion endorses private 
takings for the sole benefit of another private party.181  This type of 
resolution is misleading and could lead to legislation that is far more 
drastic than necessary.  Also, the enacted legislation could prove too 
far-reaching and over-inclusive.  Even though the drafters were care-
ful to carve out specific enumerated uses that would support the use 
of eminent domain, there is little exception in the Act when it comes 
to economic development, which may be necessary under certain cir-
cumstances, evidenced by the grave need for economic redevelop-
ment in blighted neighborhoods which cannot effectively be cured 
without comprehensive action through government. 
 174 Id. 
 175 H.R. 3083, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3135, 
109th Cong. (2005). 
 176 H.R. 3083, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3135, 
109th Cong. (2005). 
 177 H.R. 3315, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 178 H.R. 3405, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 179 H.R.J. Res. 60, 109th Cong. (2005) (amendment to read that “[n]either a State 
nor the United States may take private property for the purpose of transferring pos-
session of, or control over, that property to another private person, except for a pub-
lic conveyance or transportation project”). 
 180 See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
 181 See supra note 173–74 and accompanying text. 
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B. State Action 
In the majority opinion in Kelo, Justice Stevens emphasized “that 
nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further re-
strictions on its exercise of the takings power.”182  Justice Stevens 
commented that the public use test articulated by the Supreme Court 
is just the “federal baseline,” and that States may impose stricter re-
quirements for takings, and, in fact, some already do.183
Since the Kelo decision, legislation has been enacted in twenty-
four states and proposed in nearly every other state to limit the effect 
of the decision on state and local decision makers.184  The legislation 
attempts to use different tools and strict definitions to limit the broad 
eminent domain power announced by the Supreme Court in the de-
cision. 
The first state to pass legislation subsequent to Kelo was Dela-
ware. 185  In the act, amending the Delaware Code, the legislature 
mandates that governmental takings must be for a “recognized public 
use as described at least six months in advance of condemnation pro-
ceedings: (i) in a certified planning document, (ii) at a public hear-
ing held specifically to address the acquisition, or (iii) in a published 
report of the acquiring agency.”186  The market value of the con-
demned property is established by an independent and impartial ap-
praiser.187  Further, the Delaware Legislature specifies that it is the 
courts, as opposed to the acquiring agency, that determines compen-
sation to the private party for “reasonable attorney, appraisal and en-
gineering fees.”188
Following closely behind Delaware, the Alabama Legislature 
passed legislation limiting state and local exercise of eminent domain 
power in light of Kelo.189  The Alabama Legislature passed the bill to 
restrict private property takings for the benefit of another private 
party.190  In specifically enumerating the circumstances where private 
takings would be restricted, the statute directs that “a municipality or 
county may not condemn property for the purposes of private retail, 
 182 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005). 
 183 Id. 
 184 See infra notes 185–241 and accompanying text. 
 185 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9505(15) (2005).  
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at § 9505(11). 
 188  Id. at § 9503. 
 189 ALA. CODE §§ 11-47-170, 11-80-1 (2005) (amended by 2005-313 Ala. Adv. Legis. 
Serv. § 1 (LexisNexis)). 
 190 2005-313 Ala. Adv. Legis. Serv. § 1 (LexisNexis). 
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office, commercial, industrial, or residential development; or primar-
ily for enhancement of tax revenue; or for transfer to a person, non-
governmental entity, public-private partnership, corporation, or 
other business entity.”191  The legislature specifically exempted from 
the amendment any takings intended to cure an already blighted 
area.192  Further, the legislature provided for condemned property, 
should it cease being used for the purpose for which it was con-
demned or for some other public use, to be first offered for sale back 
to the original owner at the same price as was received by the owner 
at the time of condemnation.193
The Texas Legislature also passed a bill amending its Govern-
ment Code to limit the use of eminent domain for private parties or 
economic development purposes.194  The bill declares that any party 
that is entrusted with the power of eminent domain is prohibited 
from taking private property if a particular private party is benefited 
through the use of the property or if the stated public use is “merely a 
pretext to confer a private benefit on a particular private party.”195  
Further, the amendment prohibits private takings “for economic de-
velopment purposes, unless . . . [the purpose is] to eliminate an exist-
ing affirmative harm on society from slum or blighted areas.”196  The 
Texas amendment specifically enumerates uses for which an entity 
can use eminent domain to seize property, including transportation 
projects, water supply, hospitals, utility services, sports venue, waste 
disposal, and other commonly accepted uses of eminent domain 
power. 197  Further, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 refer to specific uses of 
eminent domain power for collection of information,198 state high-
ways,199 Trans-Texas corridor and environmental needs,200 institutes of 
higher education,201 and charitable corporations,202 respectively. 
 191 ALA CODE § 11-47-170 (2005). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. § 11-47-170(c). 
 194 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.0001 (Vernon 2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
502.0037 (Vernon 2005); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 203.052 (Vernon 2005); TEX. 
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 227.041 (Vernon 2005); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.9045 
(Vernon 2005). 
 195 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §  2206.001(b)(1) (Vernon 2005). 
 196 Id. §  2206.001 (b)(3). 
 197 Id. §  2206.001 (c). 
 198 Id. § 552.0037. 
 199 TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 203.052 (Vernon 2005). 
 200 Id. § 227.041. 
 201 TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.9045 (Vernon 2005). 
 202 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3183b-1, § 6 (Vernon 2005). 
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Following close behind these three states which were quick to 
act, many other states have subsequently enacted legislation to sig-
nificantly limit the eminent domain power of state and local govern-
ment as well as any agency or entity which possesses such power.  
Alaska,203 Colorado,204 Florida,205 Georgia,206 Idaho,207 Illinois,208 Indi-
ana,209 Iowa,210 Kansas,211 Kentucky,212 Louisiana,213 Maine,214 Minne-
sota,215 Missouri,216 Nebraska,217 New Hampshire,218 Ohio,219 Pennsyl-
 203 H.B. 319, 2006 Leg., 24th Sess. (Alaska 2005) (restricting use of eminent do-
main power when transfer of land is to private party except in regards to oil and gas 
development). 
 204 H.B. 06-1411, 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (requiring clear and 
convincing evidence of blight prior to condemnation of property). 
 205 H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg., 108th Sess. (Fla. 2006) (prohibiting taking of private 
property to eliminate blight or public nuisances and prohibiting transfer of con-
demned private property to another private party for ten years following the taking). 
 206 H.B. 1313, 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006) (specifically defining blight 
and prohibiting use of eminent domain for economic development except in the in-
stance of curing blight). 
 207 H.B. 555, 2006 Leg., 58th Sess. (Idaho 2006) (restricting eminent domain for 
transfers to private parties or for economic development while providing for judicial 
review of eminent domain takings). 
 208 S.B. 3086, 94th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2005) (prohibiting use of eminent domain for 
private development unless condemned property is in a blighted area). 
 209 H.B. 1010, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (redefining “public 
use” and implementing provisions to ease private challenges to use of eminent do-
main power). 
 210 H.F. 2351, 81st Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2006) (restricting definition 
of “public use” and shifting all expenses to the acquiring agency). 
 211 S.B. 323, 2006 Leg. (Kan. 2006) (clarifying need for “public use” before emi-
nent domain power can be used and restricting transfers to a private party to situa-
tions involving the Department of Transportation or other expressly authorized 
uses). 
 212 H.B. 508, 2006 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006) (enumerating permissible public 
uses and eliminating the term “public purpose” from legislation). 
 213 S.B. 1, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006) (constitutional amendment specifically 
defining public purposes and prohibiting condemnation of property for use by or 
transfer to a private party). 
 214 L.D. 1870, 2005 Leg., 122nd, 2d Sess. (Me. 2005) (restricting condemnation of 
property for private business or residential development, enhancement of tax reve-
nue, or transfer to private party except when property is blighted). 
 215 H.F. 2846, 2006 Leg., 84th Sess. (Minn. 2006) (prohibiting takings for private 
commercial development and defining “blight” to require an endangerment of pub-
lic health and safety and prohibiting use of eminent domain for economic develop-
ment and specifically defining public use). 
 216 H.B. 1944, 93d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006) (prohibiting use of emi-
nent domain power for economic development and requiring a finding of blight be-
fore condemnation of private property unless there is another public use). 
 217 L.B. 924, 2006 Leg., 99th, 2d. Sess. (Neb. 2006) (prohibiting use of eminent 
domain power for economic development, including increased tax revenue, em-
ployment, or economic resurgence except in conditions of blight). 
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vania,220 South Dakota,221 Tennessee,222 Utah,223 Vermont,224 West Vir-
ginia,225 and Wisconsin226 have enacted legislation to limit the impact 
of Kelo.  Arizona,227 California,228 Connecticut,229 Massachusetts,230 
 218 S.B. 287, 159th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2006) (eliminating “areas in the 
process of becoming blighted” from scope of eminent domain power and changing 
“public purpose” to “public use”). 
 219 S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006) (imposing moratorium on 
use of eminent domain power to condemn unblighted private property and transfer 
property to another private party for economic development until December 31, 
2006). 
 220 S.B. 881, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006) (prohibiting use of eminent 
domain power to take private property for private commercial development except 
for blighted areas in enumerated locations). 
 221 H.B. 1080, 2006 Leg. (S.D. 2006) (restricting use of eminent domain power to 
transfer property to private owner or non-governmental entity or for enhancement 
of tax revenue). 
 222 S.B. 3296, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006) (specifically defining 
what constitutes a public use for condemnation of private property and removing the 
right of eminent domain from certain enumerated entities). 
 223 S.B. 117, 2006 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2006) (requiring legislative approval after 
public hearing of the condemnation with the property owners having the right to be 
heard on the proposal). 
 224 S. 0246, 2005–2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2006) (prohibiting use of emi-
nent domain to confer private benefit on particular private party and restricting use 
of eminent domain for economic development). 
 225 H.B. 4048, 77th Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 2006) (restricting use of eminent do-
main power for economic development except in limited circumstances to cure 
blight). 
 226 Assemb. B. 657, 2005–2006 Leg. (Wis. 2005) (prohibiting use of eminent do-
main power for condemnation of nonblighted property if the transfer is to a private 
entity). 
 227 H.B. 2675, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006) (on file with law review), avail-
able at http://www.azleg.gov/DocumentsForBill.asp?Bill_Number=HB2675 (requir-
ing clear and convincing evidence of slum conditions on a property by property basis 
before eminent domain power can be used and prohibiting takings for economic de-
velopment). 
 228 S.B. 1206, 2006 Leg. (Cal. 2006) (on file with law review), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_1201-1250/sb_1206_bill_ 
20060929_chaptered.pdf (redefining blight and prohibiting inclusion of non-
blighted property in eminent domain taking to cure blight); A.B. 1162 (Cal. 2006) 
(on file with law review), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-
06/bill/asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1162_bill_20050902_amended_sen.pdf (proposing 
moratorium on takings of private property for private use until specified date); S.B. 
1210, 2006 Leg. (Cal. 2006) (on file with law review), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_1201-1250/sb_1210_bill_ 
20060929_chaptered.pdf (proposing prohibition on takings of nonblighted private 
property for economic development or increased tax revenue); A.C.A. 15 (Cal. 2005) 
(on file with law review), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/ 
bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sca_15_bill_20050823_amended_sen.pdf (proposing consti-
tutional amendment prohibiting redevelopment without a written finding of both 
physical and economic blight). 
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Michigan,231 Montana,232 New Jersey,233 New York,234 North Carolina,235 
Oklahoma,236 Oregon,237 Rhode Island,238 South Carolina,239 Tennes-
 229 L.C.O. 24, Gen. Assem., Feb. 2006 Sess. (Conn. 2006) (on file with law review) 
(proposing a prohibition on takings for economic development unless part of a 
comprehensive redevelopment plan which provides public use, is not for primary 
benefit of private party, and is reasonably necessary to accomplish redevelopment); 
L.C.O. 34, Gen. Assem., Feb. 2006 Sess.  (Conn. 2006) (on file with law review) (pro-
posing specifically enumerated “condemnation-eligible” property). 
 230 H.B. 4604, 184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2006) (on file with law review), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/ht04pdf/ht04604.pdf (proposing a prohibi-
tion on takings for economic development except to remedy substandard or blighted 
housing conditions); HB. 4605, 184th Gen. Ct.  (Mass. 2006) (on file with law re-
view), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/ht04pdf/ht04605.pdf  
(proposing a restriction on eminent domain when the sole purpose is economic de-
velopment). 
 231 S.J.R. E, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005) (on file with law review), available at 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2005-2006/jointresolutionenrolled/ 
Senate/pdf/2005-SNJR-E.pdf  (proposing prohibition on takings for economic de-
velopment or tax revenues); H.J.R. N., 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005) (on file 
with law review), available at  http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2005-
2006/jointresolutionintroduced/House/pdf/2005-HIJR-N.pdf (proposing a prohibi-
tion on takings for the primary benefit of private entities);  Act of Sept. 20, 2006, 
2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 367 (proposing same); H.B. 5060, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess (Mich. 
2006) (on file with law review), available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/ 
documents/2005-2006/publicact/pdf/2006-PA-0367.pdf (proposing same); S.B. 693, 
93rd Leg., Reg. Sess (Mich. 2005) (on file with law review), available at 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2005-2006/publicact/pdf/2006-PA-
0368.pdf (proposing same). 
 232 Ballot Init. 154 (Mont. 2006) (decertified from ballot consideration as of Oct. 
21, 2006 due to recent court decisions) (on file with law review), available at 
http://sos.mt.gov/ELB/archives/2006/I/I-154.asp (proposing a requirement of 
clear and convincing evidence that property is a danger to safety and health of the 
community on a property-by-property basis before a direct or indirect transfer of pri-
vate property to a private party). 
 233 S.B. 156, 212 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2006) (on file with law review), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/S0500/156_I1.PDF (proposing a prohibi-
tion on use of eminent domain under redevelopment laws); Assem. B. 3277, 212 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2006) (on file with law review), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A3500/3277_I1.PDF (proposing same); S.B. 
211, 212 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2006) (on file with law review), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/S0500/211_I1.PDF (proposing moratorium 
on use of eminent domain); Assem. B. 2423, 212 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2006) (on file 
with law review), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A2500/2423_I1.PDF (pro-
posing a forty-eight month moratorium on certain uses of eminent domain). 
 234 Assem. B. 9060 (N.Y. 2005) (on file with law review), available at 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A09060&sh=t (proposing creation of a state 
commission to consider eminent domain laws); S.B. 6216 (N.Y. 2006) (on file with 
law review) (proposing same); Assem. B. 9043 (N.Y. 2006) (on file with law review), 
available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A09043&sh=t (proposing a re-
quirement of a comprehensive development plan for economic development taking, 
and requiring municipal approval of such plans); S.B. 5946 (N.Y. 2005) (on file with 
law review) (proposing same); Assem. B. 9144 (N.Y. 2005) (on file with law review), 
available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A09144&sh=t (proposing that trans-
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see,240 and Virginia241 all have legislation pending in their respective 
state legislatures. 
fers to private developers be subject to unanimous vote of the local government 
board and permissive referendum by the public). 
 235 H.B. 1854, Gen. Assem., 2005 Sess. (N.C. 2005) (on file with law review), avail-
able at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2005/Bills/House/HTML/H1854v1. 
html (proposing a prohibition on eminent domain takings for economic develop-
ment or increased tax base); S.B. 1222, Gen. Assem., 2005 Sess.  (N.C. 2005) (on file 
with law review), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2005/Bills/ 
Senate/HTML/S1222v1.html (proposing same). 
 236 S.B. 1035, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2006) (on file with law review) (proposing 
a prohibition on eminent domain transfers to a private party for the primary purpose 
of benefiting that private party); H.B. 2092, 50th Leg., 2d Sess.  (Okla. 2006) (on file 
with law review) (proposing that condemning agency may not sell condemned pri-
vate property for five years after taking to any person besides original property 
owner); S.B. 1408, 50th Leg., 2d Sess.  (Okla. 2006) (on file with law review) (propos-
ing a prohibition on eminent domain transfers to any private party). 
 237 H.B. 3505, 73rd Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005) (on file with law review), 
available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/05reg/measpdf/hb3500.dir/hb3505.intro.pdf 
(proposing a prohibition on takings unless the property is to be owned, maintained, 
occupied, and used by the public for public purposes). 
 238 H.B. 6636, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2005) (on file with law review) 
(urging Congress to amend the Constitution to protect private property rights and 
nullify Kelo decision); S.B. 1237, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess.  (R.I. 2005) (on file 
with law review) (urging same). 
 239 H.B. 4295, Gen. Assem., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005) (on file with law review), avail-
able at http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess116_2005-2006/bills/4295.htm (proposing a 
definition of public use to require a “significant and direct” public benefit as op-
posed to a secondary or incidental benefit while a private party has the primary bene-
fit); S.B. 1029, Gen. Assem., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005) (on file with law review), available 
at http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess116_2005-2006/bills/1029.htm (proposing crea-
tion of eminent domain study committee to review eminent domain power); S.B. 
1030, Gen. Assem., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005) (on file with law review), available at 
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess116_2005-2006/bills/1030.htm (proposing dele-
tion of provisions providing for use of eminent domain to clear blighted or slum ar-
eas); A. 458, S.B. 1029, Gen. Assem., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2006) (on file with law  
review), available at http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess116_2005-2006/bills/1029.htm 
(proposing deletion of provisions providing for use of eminent domain to clear 
blighted or slum areas). 
 240 H.B. 2432, 2005 Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 2005) (on file with law review), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.tn.us/info/Leg_Archives/104GA/Bills/BillText/HB243
2.pdf (proposing a prohibition on eminent domain takings for economic develop-
ment or increased tax revenues);  S.B. 2421, 2005 Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 2005) (on file 
with law review), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.tn.us/info/Leg_Archives/104GA/Bills/BillText/SB242
1.pdf (proposing a prohibition on takings primarily for economic development and 
a shift of the burden of proof to the condemning agency). 
 241 H.B. 1278, 2006 Gen. Assem. (Va. 2006) (on file with law review), available at 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?061+ful+HB1278 (proposing that “pub-
lic use” shall not include takings of private property for the primary purpose of tax 
revenue enhancement). 
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State legislatures, although empowered with the ability to pro-
vide greater protection to private landowners, should consider such 
alternatives carefully.  Rather than restricting the use of eminent do-
main power, it is likely that many states may just need to give specific 
clarification on what can be considered a public use.  Due to the Kelo 
decision, the baseline for a public use is set low, but that does not 
mean that it is non-existent.  The most prudent move would be for 
states to thoroughly analyze their current eminent domain laws, their 
history, and their use, while imposing a moratorium on eminent do-
main actions to alleviate any public pressures.  Through this careful 
and reasoned response, the legislatures will be able to act in the best 
interest of their constituents without making any rash decisions. 
C. Grassroots Campaign 
The Institute for Justice, a libertarian group campaigning in fa-
vor of private property rights,242 spearheaded a $3 million campaign, 
entitled “Hands Off My House,” looking to protect citizens and prop-
erty rights groups in the fight against broad eminent domain 
power.243  Further, the group has drafted model legislation in order 
to facilitate state government efforts to limit the effect of Kelo.244  The 
Institute for Justice has also represented homeowners who fall victim 
to government takings through the use of eminent domain.245
Statistics have shown that almost ninety percent of Americans 
express disapproval of the governmental takings that are permitted 
by the Supreme Court after Kelo.246  In clever protest to Kelo’s em-
brace of a broad eminent domain power, a group of property rights 
activists have petitioned to have Justice Souter’s home condemned 
for redevelopment.247  The movement is led by a man from Califor-
nia, Logan Darrow Clements, who seeks to have Souter’s home in 
Weare, New Hampshire condemned and turned into a hotel, which 
Clements says will bring significantly higher tax revenue to the 
town.248  The movement is clearly motivated to prove how harmful 
 242 Hands Off Our Homes, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2005, available at 
http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4298759. 
 243 Juliana Gruenwald, Kelo Decision Unleashes Grass Roots Backlash Against Private 
Property Seizures, 74 U.S. LAW WEEK 2067 (Aug. 9, 2005). 
 244 Id. 
 245 See, e.g., City of Norwood v. Horney, 161 Ohio App. 3d 316, 2005-Ohio-2448, 
830 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
 246 Hands Off Our Homes, supra note 242. 
 247 Nightline: Judging the Judge Activists Turn Tables on Supreme Court Justice (ABC 
television broadcast Aug. 26, 2005).   
 248 Id. 
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Souter’s involvement in the Kelo majority will be to private property 
owners, with the name of the proposed hotel being the “Lost Liberty 
Hotel” and a dining room called the “Just Desserts Café.”249  Although 
the plan is not being taken seriously by many, Clements needs only 
twenty-five signatures to get the plan on the municipality’s schedule 
in March of 2006, “where a simple majority vote would force the town 
to take a serious look at claiming and rezoning Souter’s property.”250  
Justice Breyer’s vacation home in New Hampshire is also the target of 
a similar campaign to seize the property for a new park.251
As opposed to these campaigns, one challenge to eminent do-
main power recently lodged by private property owners that was 
taken seriously by the judiciary was a proposed condemnation of non-
blighted private property for economic redevelopment in Ohio.252  
On July 26, 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court issued an opinion in favor 
of private property owners.253  Represented by the Institute for Justice, 
the property owners challenged the taking of their property, alleged 
to be deteriorating, to clear way for privatized chain stores and office 
buildings.254  The lower court found that although the property was 
not blighted, it was considered “deteriorating” because there was di-
versity of ownership and the property could be more productively 
used if it were condemned and redeveloped into upscale apartments 
and commercial property.255  The lower court, therefore, allowed for 
the taking of the property for the development.256  In deciding the 
appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Supreme 
Court of the United States’ majority opinion in Kelo, instead adopting 
the view of the dissenters in that case as the more appropriate legal 
framework to interpret the Ohio Constitution.257  The Ohio Supreme 
Court, in analyzing its state constitution, held that state courts must 
apply heightened scrutiny “when reviewing statutes that regulate the 
 249 Fox News, Land Grab or ‘Just Desserts?’, Aug. 28, 2005, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,167137,00.html. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Gruenwald, supra note 243, at 2068. 
 252 See City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 
N.E.2d 1115. 
 253 See infra notes 257–60 and accompanying text. 
 254 City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 
1115, at ¶ 105. 
 255 City of Norwood v. Horney, 161 Ohio App. 3d 316, 2005-Ohio-2448, 830 
N.E.2d 381, at ¶ 37. 
 256 Id. at ¶ 38. 
 257 City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 
1115, at ¶ 76.  
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use of eminent-domain powers.”258  Further, the court held that “al-
though economic factors may be considered in determining whether 
private property may be appropriated, the fact that the appropriation 
would provide an economic benefit to the government and commu-
nity, standing alone, does not satisfy the public-use requirement of 
Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.”259 Finally, the court 
held that the use of the term “deteriorating” in eminent domain leg-
islation was void for vagueness because it “inherently incorporates 
speculation as to the future condition of the property to be appropri-
ated rather than the condition of the property at the time of the tak-
ing.”260  The Ohio Supreme Court is the first state supreme court to 
issue a decision on the breadth of its state eminent domain statute af-
ter Kelo, and, in doing so, is likely one of only few state courts to issue 
a decision prior to legislative action addressing the issue. 
VI.     IS THERE A GENERAL OVERREACTION TO KELO? 
The Kelo majority embraces a view of eminent domain power 
that is considerably more broad than previous takings jurisprudence.  
Although the Supreme Court, prior to Kelo, had put itself on the path 
of deference to the legislature and rational basis review, it was always 
careful not to write a blank check.261  The majority in Kelo, by allowing 
the government to take private land and transfer it to a subsequent 
private owner for purposes of generalized economic development, 
lost sight of its previous jurisprudence.  The Kelo majority discusses 
Berman as if it is a congruent analysis, but, in fact, Berman is readily 
distinguishable by the overriding goal of the plan, in that case to cure 
blight.  With a readily identifiable problem or harm being cured, as 
opposed to generalized economic benefit to the community, the Su-
preme Court had adequately restricted governmental takings power.  
As Justice O’Connor pointed out in her dissent, the Supreme Court 
had previously allowed takings of private property with a subsequent 
private owner to cure a specific harm or evil to society.262  Such a use 
of the eminent domain power is consistent with the function of gov-
ernment, and legislatures should be careful in going too far in limit-
ing Kelo, as they may inadvertently constrict an important government 
tool.  Economic development does not automatically correlate to a 
misguided or improper taking, as there may be times when it is justi-
 258 Id. at ¶ 10.   
 259 Id. at ¶ 9. 
 260 Id. at ¶ 10. 
 261 See supra notes 24–68 and accompanying text (discussing Berman and Midkiff). 
 262 See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. 
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fied to combat a specific harm to society, such as blighted neighbor-
hoods or slums that require such governmental action. 
The Kelo decision, in part due to its own language allowing the 
States to provide greater protection to private property rights of its 
citizens, has caused a torrent of  action at every level of the country to 
restrict the effect of the ruling.  The list of remedies and tools used by 
the federal government, state governments, and citizens of the coun-
try is broad and varied, some with a more significant effect than oth-
ers.  Overall, legislation and reaction subsequent to Kelo can be di-
vided into two categories: innocuous and potentially harmful. 
A. Innocuous Legislation 
Innocuous legislation, both proposed and enacted, in reaction 
to the Kelo decision is legislation that does not present a risk of harm-
ful, possibly inadvertent, consequences.  Innocuous legislation en-
compasses those bills proposed in state legislatures that say little more 
than “eminent domain may not be used to benefit a particular private 
party.”263  This idea adds nothing new to eminent domain jurispru-
dence at the federal or state level because this specific private tak-
ing/private benefit restriction on eminent domain power has been 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Mid-
kiff,264 and reaffirmed by the majority opinion in Kelo.265  This legisla-
tion does nothing to address the problem of allowing the public use 
test to be satisfied by broad economic development.  The likely pur-
pose of legislation such as this is to provide peace of mind to those 
constituents concerned that the government will use its takings power 
for an improper purpose or with underhanded motives.  Assuming 
the government is acting fairly and without deceitful motives, there is 
no real risk in passing legislation stating that the government needs 
to act in such a manner. 
Also on the list of innocuous legislation are bills that ensure a 
right of reverter to the party that is the victim of the condemnation 
proceedings, regardless of the public use that justified such a taking 
in the first place.266  Such legislation ensures that the party who loses 
 263 See e.g., supra notes 224, 231, 236. 
 264 Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (“A purely private tak-
ing could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no 
legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.”). 
 265 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661 (“[T]he City would no doubt 
be forbidden from taking petitioners’ land for the purpose of conferring a private 
benefit on a particular private party.”). 
 266 See, e.g., ALA CODE § 11-47-170(c) (2005). 
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his land will have the first right to buy back the land at the price re-
ceived as just compensation should the property cease being used for 
a public use.267  It is hard to see when “economic redevelopment” 
ceases to be a public use, but this reverter may apply under circum-
stances where there is a more classic public use, such as a park which 
no longer functions in that capacity.  This legislation is innocuous in 
two ways.  First, it promotes a level of fairness in the condemnation 
process in that the owner who is forced to leave his land without his 
consent will have a right or possibility of repossessing the land at no 
greater cost if a public use is no longer satisfied.  Second, the legisla-
tion is likely innocuous because it is hard to see its practical effect.  
Those private owners whose property is condemned by the govern-
ment for economic development are obviously going to use the funds 
to relocate and settle into a home or start a new business somewhere 
else.  In theory, the economic development could be terminated and 
the property offered to the private owner at the same price received, 
but this could happen many years in the future.  Once the property is 
actually taken and the economic development begins, it is unlikely 
that a property owner will attempt to repurchase the property. 
The most prudent course of action for legislators that has an in-
nocuous effect is enforcing an eminent domain moratorium.  This 
tool is used to stop the use of eminent domain power by state and lo-
cal government for a determined period of time while the legislature 
has a chance to study and consider its current eminent domain laws 
and any proposed changes or increased restrictions to those laws.268  
While the moratorium may have the effect of curtailing eminent do-
main projects currently, it also affords representatives the time and 
ability to act with prudence because they are not in a race against the 
clock to stop a specific taking or respond to political pressures from 
constituents.  Instead of a rush to judgment, which could lead to a 
remedy that is too broad or has harmful future effects, the morato-
rium gives the opportunity to consider all the consequences of legis-
lation, thus allowing for a more rational, practical decision.  It is likely 
that the legislators may not need to completely overhaul their emi-
nent domain legislation, but instead just clarify the requirements of a 
 267 Id. 
 268 The eminent domain moratorium was ordered by the Governor of Connecti-
cut Jodi Rell and has halted the redevelopment plan in New London until the legisla-
ture has the opportunity to review Connecticut eminent domain laws.  Lisa Knepper 
& John Kramer, Grassroots Groundswell Grows Against Eminent Domain Abuse, INST. FOR 
JUST, July 12, 2005, available at http://ij.org/private_property/connecticut/ 
7_12_05pr.html; see also S.B. 1206, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (proposing 
moratorium on takings of private property for private use until specified date). 
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public use.  These possible courses of action need to be carefully con-
sidered and not the result of rushed reactions to the Kelo decision. 
B. Potentially Harmful Legislation and Reaction 
In the wake of the Kelo decision, the surge of responses at both 
the federal and state level could prove to be excessively restricting, 
and thus harmful to eminent domain power, long seen as an essential 
power of the government.  Also, the significant increase in public at-
tention towards the power of eminent domain and continued sup-
port for challenges to eminent domain power could prove restrictive 
and harmful to overall government operation. 
The most troublesome legislation is that which states “economic 
development shall not be considered a public purpose.”269  This legis-
lation is potentially harmful because it utilizes inappropriately broad 
language in crafting a remedy that has the capability of excessively re-
stricting a necessary governmental tool.  While some proposed state 
statutes qualify this language by excepting blighted areas or slums 
from the purview of the proposed statute,270 much of the proposed 
legislation contains no such condition.271  Proposed bills in both the 
Senate and the House of Representatives state specifically that the 
term “public use” shall not be construed to include economic devel-
opment.272  None of the proposed bills in Congress set forth any cir-
cumstances or conditions where economic development would satisfy 
a public use and therefore be constitutional.273  The problem with 
such legislation is that it is directly contradictory to sound Supreme 
Court precedent,274 and it expressly removes a tool used throughout 
history to clean up “miserable and disreputable housing conditions” 
which may “suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there 
to the status of cattle.”275  Further, this legislation does not contem-
plate any potential situations in the future where eminent domain 
power may need to be used for economic development to promote a 
 269 See supra notes 206, 207, 208, 214, 216, 217, 220, 224, 225, 228, 230, 231, 235, 
240. 
 270 See supra notes 206, 208, 214, 216, 217, 220, 225. 
 271 See supra notes 207, 224, 228, 230, 231, 235, 240. 
 272 See supra notes 168–70, 175–76 and accompanying text. 
 273 See supra notes 168–79 and accompanying text. 
 274 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that economic redevelopment 
plan was a constitutional public use because its purpose was to cure blight in a speci-
fied area of the city); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding 
that breaking up of land oligopoly creating a more liquid, economic real estate mar-
ket was constitutional). 
 275 Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. 
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necessary project or cure a particular harm to society.276  It is a dan-
gerous path to take for legislators to restrict a key governmental tool 
with such broad language. 
This criticism is the same for proposed legislation that specifi-
cally enumerates what could constitute a public use for the purposes 
of eminent domain.  Even the strong dissents in Kelo state that emi-
nent domain power satisfies a public use if the “targeted property in-
flicted affirmative harm on society.”277  This restrictive legislation, at 
both the federal and state level, which specifically removes economic 
development from the definition of public use, may prevent the gov-
ernment from utilizing an important tool to correct potentially harm-
ful situations. 
The federal act signed into law in late November 2005278 also has 
problems with ambiguity.  Specifically, the bill states that “in this Act, 
the term ‘public use’ shall not be construed to include economic de-
velopment for the primary benefit of a private party.”279  The lan-
guage used by Congress remains vague when trying to figure out who 
receives the “primary benefit.”  Cleaning up slums using eminent 
domain has been an accepted function of the power,280 but, under 
such circumstances, more often than not the developer would be re-
ceiving more of a benefit than each individual property owner.  On 
the other hand, however, the entire redevelopment as a whole when 
compared to the benefit received by the redeveloper may shift the 
balance.  Further, monetary benefit cannot be considered the sole 
benchmark to determine “benefit,” as other intangibles, such as 
comprehensiveness of the plan and increased productivity of the re-
developed neighborhood, must be taken into account.  Due to the 
unsettled nature of the effects of both the Kelo decision itself and the 
response legislation, the future remains uncertain. 
VII.     CONCLUSION 
Kelo is a decision that has been widely criticized for its broad view 
of the definition of public use and the takings power.281  The decision 
 276 This could include damage brought on by a natural disaster, say, for example, 
devastation from a hurricane. 
 277 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2674 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dis-
senting). 
 278 See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text. 
 279 Act of Nov. 30, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 2396 (2005); see su-
pra note 162. 
 280 See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text. 
 281 See supra Part IV.-V. 
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has sparked a great reaction by federal and state legislatures to limit 
the impact of that holding.282  This reaction to Kelo, in fact, may result 
in significant constraints on the power of government to take private 
land for any economic development.283  It is important to realize that 
in the wake of such a widely criticized decision, in the rush to cure 
the defect, something may be missed or a consequence may go unno-
ticed.284  Imposing a moratorium on eminent domain power for eco-
nomic development while the legislature can carefully consider its 
options is a prudent course of action that can ensure thoughtful and 
rational reaction to the decision.  Broad sweeping remedies, such as a 
blanket restriction on economic development satisfying a public use, 
go too far.  Economic development still has a place as a public use in 
certain circumstances when it is aimed at curing a specifically identi-
fiable harm to society.  Admittedly, Alabama and Texas, which have 
acted through a special session of the legislature to pass legislation 
limiting the eminent domain power within the state, 285 have both 
drafted legislation that does not, on its face, sweep too broadly.  Even 
so, it remains to be seen whether the state courts, where these litiga-
tion battles increasingly will be fought, will construe this legislation to 
prohibit all such economic development takings, thereby significantly 
restricting even broadly acceptable eminent domain power. 
 
 282 See supra Part V. 
 283 See supra Part VI. 
 284 See supra Part VI.B. 
 285 See supra notes 189–202 and accompanying text. 
